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REPLY TO STATE':lENT OF 
FACTS BY P.LSPmm2~1TS 
Alt~~-0h Ap~ellant does not believe that the differences 
between ti,2 Stat~_,-,,2nt of Facts in Respondents' and Appellant's 
briefs sho~ld be c12terminative of the outcome of this appeal, 
he neverth2less would like to take issue with some of the 
state:11ent3 ;nade by Respondents. 
In their Statement of Facts, Respondents state that 
Appellant's brief "in several instances states that the 
Millers' home is three stories high ... This is a total mis-
representation. Since such statements are irrelevant to any 
issue before the Court on appeal, it is assumed that they are 
injected to influence the Court's sense of equity." 
~spondents' Brief at 6, fn. While Appellant may agree that 
such facts may be irrelevant to any issue before the Court on 
appeal, it certainly does not agree that such statements were 
"injected" to influence the Court's sense of equity. Respond-
ents are correct in their assumption and position that the 
briefs sho~ld only deal with the issues which are properly 
before the Court, but in viec,,r of such assumption it is difficult 
to understand why Respondents' brief is replete with facts 
which are not properly before the Court and which were never 
introduced in the Lower Court. 
Res~u~dents' brief states that when suit was brought by 
Dr. r:1•· 1:J\\--,,-i anc1 r)r. Herzber') the "external frame of the 
\li l] '- r_- .~ I 
'' fully in r.l:ice" (Respondents I Brief at 3) 
\ i:_:, 
ti1-1 t sue'' s ta r:e of affairs was caused by 
. l . 
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the fact that while Defendant Miller kept assuring the 
other 
parties that modifications would be made to bring the ho 
use 
in compliance with the covenants and repeatedly reques~d t~ 
other parties to refrain from starting legal action, trying 
to gain time, he was continuing construction on the house 
under the original plans. 
Respondents' Brief also improperly includes, as an attach-
ment, physical evidence of the transfer of title from Phenix 
Investment, Inc. to Northcrest Investment Corporation. While 
this is only one in a chain of transfers of titles, it is 
improperly introduced at the appeal level. In addition, by 
its elf, it does not shed any light on the actual chains of 
title affecting the claims of the parties. 
Respondents' also introduce in their brief new evidence 
as to the consideration paid in the purchase of the stock of 
Northcrest Manor by Mr. James B. Cunningham. Appellant did 
not claim in his brief, as the Respondents would have the 
Court believe, that the stoc~~ of the Northcrest Manor was 
purchased for nominal consideration but rather that the trans-
fers of assets from one corporate name to another occurred for 
nominal consideration. 
Respondents' Brief also states that "(s] ince the entry 
of the Order and Judgment the Mil le rs' home has been completed 
and the Millers are now occupying it as their residence." . 
. n 
Respondents' Brief at 5. Given Respondents' app0rent aversic. 
to the introduction, in the briefs, of facts not properly 
. 2. 
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.~.;_cticr~ 
;r is har: to find any reason for the intro-
: = ·_, ~tateme~r ')~her than to influence the Court. 
POINT I 
~~ :? COURT E2RED IN FINDING THAT 
~1 ::_C:,I:\'I'IFF HAD NO STANDING TO SUE. 
It is i~te~esting to note that Respondents, trying to 
support their claim that Appellant has no standing to sue, 
only cite two cases which did in fact give plaintiffs in both 
cases the right to sue. 
Moreover Respondents claim that Appellant has no standing 
because he did :wt take under the same chain of title as 
?.esponden ts . Aside from the fact that Northcrest Manor owned 
the land on 1;hic'.1 Respondents' house was erected and therefore 
there 1·12s a c·o:c:-.'.:ln original gr an tor, Appellant was not given 
the oppor::·J,1i ty to in traduce any evidence showing that the 
9urchaser of the stock of Northcrest Manor (Mr. James B. 
Cunningh2.m) :-Jro:-:iised to Northcrest Manor to continue the 
development '-.J:ider the same conditions and the same covenants 
as Northcre s ~ C.lanor, which he did. Moreover the change in 
~nership o~ the stock of a company does not affect the duties 
and oblic;2ti'l:is of a company and even the promise made by Mr. 
:unniw;h,-:w1 1.,-0c•::.:~ not have been necessary to give standing to 
, 
1rl :· -rt t ~s nut proper where questions of fact 
·:JP'-' l l rn' , to this day, has not b2en qiven 
I r 1 ~- C 1 ·, ~vidence which would show he does 
. 3. 
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ir.d2ed have standing. Ti1is n~as :,1 o.lone s'1ould be sufficient 
to reverse the findings of the Lower Court. 
POINT II 
T'.-1'.C DOCTRI:'-JE OF. r:c:·UITABLE 
ESTO?PEL DOES AP~Li TO 
DEFENDA~TS-RESPbNDE~TS. 
To state, as Respondents do (R.espondents' Brief at 16), 
that Appellant uses an alternate doctrine of law because it 
recognizes the weakness of his other arguments is simply 
ridiculous. The law has long recognized that a plaintiff m~ 
be entitled to relief under alternate doctrines without 
necessarily implying that one doctrine is weaker than the 
other. 
Respondents do not have a clear view of the reality of 
the facts when they state that "since Appellant purchased his 
lot in a chain of title from Northcrest Manor, and not from 
Northcrest Investment, it is difficult if not impossible to 
see how Northcrest Investment could be in a position wherein 
Appellant was relying upon anything it did or said. 
Respondents' Brief at 1 7. When Appellant purchased his lot 
he had the opportunity to verify, through the maps available 
at the County Recorder's Office, that his lot was completely 
surrounded by other lots, including Respondents', which 
were also in the Northcrest Subiivision. Such map clearly 
did not contain any indication th~t, as Respondents claim, 
~;~:~:, lots were actually not ir. the same subdivision for 
. 4. 
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in AJpellant's chain of title. 
IL is t~2re~ore cl2~~ "hat even though reliance on this 
doctrine i= not ~eces==ry, it would certainly be sufficient 
:?OINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF \'lAS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED 
BY THE JUDGMENT IN THE PRIOR ACTION. 
Respondents fail to cite any cases showing the applica-
bility of collateral estoppel to a party who was not a party 
to the prior action. To Appellant's knowledge no such case 
exists. Since the Lower Court found that Appellant was 
collaterally estopped and ".espondents have been unable to cite 
eve~ one case where a plai~tiff not a party to the prior 
action was collaterally estopped, the decision should be 
reversed. 
The position taken by Respondents that once a defendant 
has successfully litigated a suit he cannot be sued again on 
the same issue by another plaintiff not a party to the first 
action is clearly erroneous and novel under existing law in 
any jurisdiction. Such position would negate the principle 
theit each party is entitled to his day in Court. 
The '.1eak!!oss of Re:opondents' position is shown by the 
fact thnl the first cas2 c~ted by them, In re Town of West 
1°.2d 105 (1958), is clearly 
situation. In In re Town of 
. 5. 
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'.'7est Jord.-;n Plaintif:s in the brn suits were the same. Since 
the issue in question i~ the second :Cc'i t was the same as in 
the fi:::-st one and Plaintiffs had alreci.dy had their day in Court, 
the Court properly held that res judicata applied. In this Cass 
Appellant was not a party to the first suit and In re 'Town of 
West Jordan certainly sheds no light on whether he is bound by 
the prior judgment. 
Respondents also seem to confuse the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. Although the Court held that 
Appellant was barred by collateral estoppel, Respondents, 
obviously unable to find any cases supporting the position that 
Appellant's suit should be barred by collateral estoppel, try 
to support their position using cases where the holding is 
based on the doctrine of res j~dicata. 
Respondents state that Appellant should be barred from 
bringin:,J suit because he is in privity with the Plaintiffs in 
the first suit. To support their contention that Appellant 
was in privity with the prior Plaintiffs, Respondents cite 
National Lead Co. v. Nilsen, 131 F.2d 51 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 318 U.S. 758 (1953): obviously a poor choice on 
Respondents' part since in that case, even though the Plaintiff 
in the second action controlled a corporation which was a 
party in the first action, the Court held that no privity 
existed between Plaintiff and the:' corpQration which he controllil 
and that therefore his action was not barred. II 
Respondents also cite z.-iragosa v. Craven, 31 Cal.2nd 3ll, 
I 
. 6. 
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a '.-.-J C:r~ -.;s s barred from bringing an 
1 ~ti 0 n ~]ains~ d2f~nd0n~ who ~~d successfully defended a prior 
0uit bcught by t':e 0--.c::;':Jand. Tl::e Court held that husband and 
·ife ~~e in 9ri~ity sinc2 an1' reco~ery by either one would 
and 637 of the Cali=ornia Code. No such statute exists here 
linking _Z\.ppellant and t'.-le prior plaintiffs. 
In some of the cases cited by Respondents privity was 
held to exist because the party in the prior action was 
suing on behalf of the party to the second action. In State 
Fam Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Salazar, 155 Cal. App.2d 861, 
318 P.2d 210 (1957), t'.-:e insured was barred from bringing a 
second action since the i~sJrance company had already brought 
a prior action in the insured's name. 
Respondents keep stating t'.-lat Courts are willing to 
take a broad '1ie•_.1 of pri·,,ity and that a plaintiff in a subse-
quent action sho~ld be barred if the issue was determined in 
the prior action. To bolster their statement Respondents 
rel:; o~. Hixson v. Kansas City, 361 Mo.1211, 239 S.W.2d 341 
(1951), (Respondents' Brief at 22), Barret v. City of Chicago, 
11 Ill. App.2d 146, 136 N.E.2d 564 (1956) and Campbell v. 
·:assau Count:;, 192 ;.1isc. 821, 82 N.Y.S.2d 179, aff'd, 274 
"-Pp. Die. 929, 8"3 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1948) (Respondents' Brief at 
·1 :'3) · S•1ch cases arCC'. rDt controlling since the defendants in 
I 
I --:r~'J,- ti_r);i ::cp·ce::::~: ~1tsd the c:lass of citizens. 
I 
. 7. 
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In an e~f~rt to show the existance of privi·~y b 
-- et\·10en 
Appellant and the prior plaintiffs, Respondents rely on d" ictu~ 
in Tanner v. B.:!con, 103 Utah 49'-l, 136 P.2d 957 (1943), which 
held that no privity existed and is contrary to the doctrine 
Respondents are trying to establish. 
Respondents carefully avoid distinguishing any of the 
cases cited by Appellant which clearly show the inapplicability 
of res judicata to this situation. If Respondents' arguments 
were held to be correct, one would certainly have to come to 
the conclusion that, for example, a plaintiff in an aircraft 
crash would be barred from relitigating the issue of the 
airline's liability if the airline had successfully defend~ 
against another plaintiff. This is clearly not the law. [See 
Humpreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973) .] Appellant's 
Brief at 11, 14, 15. 
POINT IV 
THE APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL DID RESULT IN A DENIAL 
OE' DUE PROCESS IN THIS CASE. 
Respondents argue (Respondents' Brief at 30) that the 
right to a day in Court is not absolute and that in this case 
Appellant should be bound because he was in privity with prior 
plaintiffs. Respondents then define privies as "persons w~ 
are affected by lawsuits but who are not entitled to notice, 
'-''-- t:::· ".l he?cing and ·11ho have no control over the litiqation 
and no right to appeal". Respondents' Brief at JO. Such 
. 8. 
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:s cc?rt3inJ_ 
· c~ ~ not su9ported by any citation, 
'1c.h·21 one si,1c:c-_ ocie ca:-inot imagine a more bla-
t;nt de'". i_:t.'.. ·O. ~1 ,·c process tinn the one which would result 
Respondents also 
incorrectl~ st~t2 that the issue of privity was twice argued 
orally to c:--J : ~ 2 c:o;1J.2r bel01·;. The issue of privi ty was never 
argued belo·H ar:d certainly Judge Conder could not have made 
any finding of fact on facts which were never introduced. 
Respondents simply argued that once a Court has decided an 
issue, the finding is a bar to any other party under the 
doct~ine of res judicata. To show that privity existed 
between Appellant and the prior plaintiffs, Respondents would 
have hctd to s':cY.v a legal relatio:-iship between the parties 
sufficient to establish privity. No evidence was introduced 
or arguments rade to establish such relationship. Respondents 
therefore, in their brief (Respondents' Brief at 30) have 
simply missta~ed the facts. 
To p:ove how freely Courts are willing to apply collateral 
estoppel or :es judicata, Respondents keep citing freely generic 
dicta froffi various cases without pointing out that in all of the 
~ases by them cited the people barred from relitigating the 
issue had a legal relationship with the party to the prior 
suit '-"'':i_ch J'lYc.c th.'m legallj thi:; same individual. 
-J c-s' rcforc.'''~~e to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Lef at 35), I:li:;states the law under the 
r'. c:cue-; it.-; aprilicability in the context of this 
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case. Rule 23, i:-: certain i:-i:; ta.-ice3, ::i.l lo,,s a judgment to be 
binding on the m2r.1bers of a class w:10 had no opportunity to 
participate in the proceedings only upon a judgment by the 
Court, which originally heard the case, that includes and 
describes those that the Court found to be members of the 
class. The first suit in the instant case was not a class 
action suit and, had it been, no such finding was made by the 
Court. 
. 10. 
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DATED: April 6, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NANN NOVINSKI-DURANDO 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered two 
copies of the foregoing to Anthony L. Rampton, Attorney for 
Defendants, at 800 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101, on April 6, 1978. 
NANN NOVINSKI-DURANDO 
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